|
Back to
Table of Contents
Rural Hospital Flexibility Program Tracking Project
Executive Summary
Amy Hagopian, M.H.A.
L. Gary Hart, Ph.D.
WWAMI, University of Washington
The Rural Hospital
Flexibility Program (RHFP) was interpreted by Congress to provide
financial relief to America’s smallest and most vulnerable rural
hospitals. RHFP was passed in
1997 as part of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA).
The Federal Office of Rural Health Policy (FORHP) became the
implementation agency, and it in turn contracted with its designated Rural
Health Research Centers to track the progress of the program.
This report covers the first year of the Rural Hospital Flexibility
Program Tracking Project, 1999-2000.
This Executive Summary
offers observations and summary statements that are further substantiated
in the following chapters.
1.
There have been many
conversions to Critical Access Hospital (CAH) status.
One hundred seventy hospitals have been designated as CAHs as of
May 31, 2000. That is
significant growth in a program that is so new.
See Chapter 3.
2.
Even in these early stages,
the RHFP is promising. The
enthusiasm for the RHFP is significant.
The program has generated a great deal of dialogue among rural
health advocates, practitioners, policy makers and others.
Regional, state and local meetings are held to discuss how the
program can be used to strengthen and expand health services in rural
areas. Many players from a
number of sectors are involved in networking and coalition-building to an
unprecedented extent, much of it fueled by resources and energy supplied
by the RHFP.
3.
FORHP
has articulated five goals for the RHFP.
While goals are not explicit in the legislation, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) and the FORHP have deduced and interpreted
the goals of the program. FORHP
articulated those in its request for proposals from state offices of rural
health. These include:
developing state rural health plans, designating CAHs, developing rural
health networks, improving emergency medical services (EMS), and enhancing
quality of care. States are
variously interpreting how they will address those goals.
4.
There are key factors that
predict the success of a CAH conversion process.
Site visits for this Tracking Project determined that the following
elements are key to successful conversions: internal hospital systems
changes, community support, help from state agencies, help from a network
hospital, and consulting support. Internal
hospital elements include buy-in and enthusiasm of physicians, emphasizing
the role of the emergency room as a portal to the community, improving
administration, cross-training, systems for reminding staff of changes in
operations, keeping up morale, eliminating extraneous efforts that
distract from priorities, generating new revenues from new services, and
securing board support. See
Chapter 5.
5.
Successful implementation of
RHFP extends beyond the numbers of conversions.
Some states have many CAH conversions, some very few and others
none. The states focused on
ensuring the conversions are appropriate, and performed after a process of
community involvement may not have the most conversions.
States that had pre-cursor programs, such as Essential Access
Community Hospital-Rural Primary Care Hospital (EACH-RPCH) or Medical
Access Facility (MAF), grandfathered those facilities into the RHFP and
therefore have larger numbers of CAHs. See Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4.
6.
New relationships are being
established between offices of rural health and hospitals.
Many offices of rural health (ORH) are diverting large portions
of their federal grants to fund projects in individual communities.
These mini-grant programs are very popular, and are funding
activities such as feasibility studies, community development work,
equipment, and technical assistance with network formation. See Chapter
4.
7.
RHFP funds support
infrastructure building. CAH
funds are flowing to a number of organizations and institutions that work
to maintain an ongoing capacity to provide rural health.
This funding, therefore, can be viewed as supporting basic
infrastructure that directly aids rural hospitals and health delivery
organizations. See Chapter 4.
8.
Hospital association and
office of rural health relationships are key.
States that already have strong relationships between the state
office of rural health and the state hospital association were able to
move ahead quickly on implementing RHFP. In states where there was not a
pre-existing strong relationship, the RHFP provides an opportunity for
state offices of rural health to develop collaborative relationships with
their state hospital associations, such as by contracting with
associations for product deliverables or jointly offering technical
assistance. These
relationships can extend or enhance the capacity of individual state
offices of rural health during the development and implementation states
of the RHFP. See Chapter
4.
9.
Quality assurance and
credentialing requirements have resulted in structural changes.
The quality improvement goals of RHFP have resulted in real changes
in how rural hospitals organize those processes.
Sometimes the changes are purely cosmetic, but in many cases the
requirements have provided the motivation needed to create relationships
with outside entities to strengthen those processes. See Chapter
5.
10.
Network creation was
sometimes very helpful, sometimes just an exercise.
Some states required all CAHs to belong to networks, while other
states met the federal requirement with only minimal network creation.
As a corollary, some hospitals met the network requirement with a
minimalist exercise of creating transfer protocols, while others created
new and energizing relationships with network partners, leading to
improvements in scope of services, quality of care and financial
stability. See Chapter 4 and Chapter
5.
11.
Financial relief from BBA
‘97 was critical. The
RHFP may not have come in time to save some rural hospitals from the
consequences of BBA Medicare cuts, and it may not prove to be real relief
for others. Nonetheless,
rural hospital margins were seriously threatened and the program arrived
none too soon as a means of stabilizing the financial conditions of many
rural hospitals. Although it
requires a complete year’s cycle to create the cost reports that will
validate our early assertions, many hospitals perceived that this program
provided the financial cushion to allow them to think about long-term
issues rather than focusing solely on current financial crises. See
Chapter 6 and Appendix 1.
12.
The first hospitals to
convert to CAH status were those where the least changes were made to meet
the requirements. These
were the smallest hospitals, hospitals which easily met the mileage
requirements, hospitals where the length of stay was short enough to meet
the 96-hour requirement, and hospitals where swing beds were already in
place. Nonetheless, they need
to go through the licensure survey process, and make changes to or develop
new policies and procedures, requiring a certain amount of capacity,
initiative and organization. See Chapter 3.
13.
Role of management firms in
promoting the program turned out to be important.
A number of hospitals were motivated to convert because of their
management companies. When
management companies cross state lines, they are exposed to the program
from a variety of state perspectives.
In one state, for example, the program is moving very slowly but
two hospitals converted because their management companies (two different
companies) had experience with the program in other states.
See Chapter 5.
14.
Characteristics of CAH
conversion communities indicate the program is reaching the intended
population. The
median population of communities with CAHs is 9,752—much smaller than
the “all rural hospital” median of 23,826.
More than half of the communities (58%) were designated as BOTH
kinds of health professional shortage areas (HPSAs and MUAs).
Only 8 percent were neither HPSA nor MUA communities. See Chapter
3.
15.
CAH conversion and network
affiliation are not silver bullets.
While cost-based Medicare reimbursement is very helpful to many, if
not most, of the hospitals targeted by the RHFP, it will not solve all
their problems. Medicare is
not the only payer. Some
vulnerable populations, such as the working poor, obstetrical patients,
and American Indians, are not typically covered by Medicare.
And reimbursement for costs alone does not provide the necessary
funds or cash flow for equipment and physical plant replacement and
expansion, nor does it provide the funds necessary to relieve
previously-incurred debt.
16.
Medicaid and the Indian
Health Service are not consistently participating.
In twelve states (Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota
(outpatient only), Montana (inpatient only), North Carolina, Nebraska,
Nevada, Oregon, Texas and West Virginia), Medicaid is following suit with
Medicare and is reimbursing on a cost basis.
The Indian Health Service has not yet committed to participating,
and some hospitals are anxiously awaiting its decision to do so. See Chapter
4 and Chapter 5.
17.
The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) and its Fiscal Intermediaries were not well prepared
to implement the CAH program.
Hospitals going through the conversion process found the process to
be slow, unclear and fraught with error.
The selection of a conversion date was often retroactive, causing
the need to “unbill” and “rebill” with attendant cash flow
problems and costs. See
Chapter 4.
18.
Lab reimbursement remains a
hurdle. Many of the
financial feasibility studies that modeled the benefits of conversion for
hospitals indicated that lab fees composed a large portion of any
additional revenues to be realized. The
Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) language confused the issue of how
lab reimbursement works for CAHs. This
created a barrier for a number of hospitals considering conversion (whole
states are waiting the resolution of this question before converting any
additional hospitals), and has reduced the benefit of conversion for
others.
19.
Certificate of Need is a
barrier in some states. The
10 swing beds that CAHs are allotted in the federal legislation are not
necessarily obtainable under state Certificate of Need (CON) laws. CAH
conversions in some states are being seriously delayed by their
requirements to have a full review for swing beds under CON laws.
See Chapter 4.
20.
Medicare ambulance fee
schedule and RHFP goals may not be compatible.
It will be important to monitor the effect of the new Medicare fee
schedule for ambulance transports on the EMS systems serving CAHs.
Beginning in January 2001, all Medicare ambulance services will be
paid for under a new Medicare fee schedule. CAHs that operate their own or
contract with an ambulance service will no longer be able to receive
cost-based reimbursement for ambulance transports.
Because some CAHs or CAH-affiliated providers may see a potentially
large reduction in their Medicare ambulance fees, this change may
encourage hospitals to divest their hospital-owned ambulance services or
to discontinue some contractual agreements. See Chapter
7.
21.
CAHs face change in the
Medicare outpatient payment system.
In the original legislation, CAHs could bill for physician services
provided in their outpatient settings (regardless of whether the physician
was a hospital employee) under an “all-inclusive” rate calculated on
the basis of costs. Under the
BBRA, this option was changed to limit the amount of payment hospitals
could bill to what the physician would be paid under the Medicare fee
schedule. This means CAHs
have lost a valuable tool and incentive for networking with physicians and
other providers. Simultaneously,
CAHs are faced with participating in data collection for HCFA’s
outpatient prospective payment system, even though CAHs are expected to be
held harmless from any losses attributable to it.
There are costs associated with this data collection.
22.
HCFA reimbursement systems
are complex and complicated.
Hospital administrators, board members and physicians voiced
cynicism about the ever-changing system of rules and regulations under
which they operate, and many are convinced that as soon as their hospitals
master the current set of rules and begin to stabilize their operations
after the BBA, the rules will change again and they will be back where
they started.
23.
Financial feasibility studies
may not be reliable. There
are many financial feasibility prediction tools and consultants who employ
them. The results of these
can vary significantly. Without
a standardized or validated approach, hospitals are making important
choices based on sometimes flawed information.
24.
Multiple things are going on
at once. Any study
of rural hospital changes is necessarily complicated by the complex
environment in which they operate. Are
the fortunes of the CAH up or down because of its conversion, or are they
the result of changes in administration, market factors, HCFA
reimbursement mechanisms, managed care, physician recruitment or losses,
or other factors?
25.
Program could lose its focus.
To date, most of the states we visited have employed very broad
criteria for designating CAHs and targeting grant or other technical
assistance. CAH hospital
administrators and others we spoke with raised some concern that the use
of very inclusive criteria may change the original intent of the program
and may undermine the achievement of some of the program’s fundamental
goals. Specifically, the
broad criteria, together with the change in the 96-hour rule, may
undermine the fundamental program incentives to pursue serious network
development, in which case, hospitals are primarily motivated by the
prospects for cost-based reimbursement. See Chapter
4.
26.
Hospital administrators are
key. Regardless of
the federal reimbursement mechanisms in place, a critical factor in rural
hospital success or failure remains the quality of leadership at the
facility. This requires good teamwork among the hospital medical staff,
governing board and administration. As
the head of the team, the hospital administrator is critical.
See Chapter 5.
27.
Physician involvement is
essential. Hospitals
and their physician staffs typically engaged in serious conversations
prior to making the conversion decision.
In some ways, this program offered an opportunity to bring together
physicians and hospitals in a strategic thinking process that may have
been long overdue in some settings. See
Chapter 5.
28.
State rural health plans are
of variable utility. Some
states go through meaningful processes to produce state health plans that
really reflect goals and priorities for rural health policy in their
states. In other states,
however, the plans (and their development processes) are simply empty
exercises. There may be
better proxies for demonstrating that key players have worked together to
plan for improved rural health outcomes.
See Chapter 4.
29.
The program is moving more
quickly in some states than others.
Thirty-seven states have submitted state rural health plans to
HCFA and had them approved; another two are pending.
Nine states are still working on their plans.
Two states are not eligible. That
leaves nine states not yet participating.
See Chapter 3.
30.
Some states have strong rural
health agendas, and used RHFP as another stepping stone to accomplishing
their plans. In the
states with strong and clear rural health plans (written or otherwise),
the RHFP offered another vehicle for getting those plans accomplished.
Some state offices made very specific requirements of hospitals
before allowing them to convert to CAH status.
Some states felt it was their role to facilitate the needs and
desires of their hospitals, rather than impose an agenda of their own.
These two views are both accommodated when Congress allows states
to interpret the legislation liberally.
See Chapter 4.
Chapter 1: Introduction (WWAMI)
RHFP
Home
RHFP Information
| RHFP Tracking
Project | RHFP
Publications | RHFP
Contacts
Search | RUPRI
Copyright
© 1999, Rural Policy Research Institute
DMCA and other copyright
information.
Last updated 20 October 2008 03:44:18 PM -0500
URL: http://www.rupri.org/rhfp-track/year1/execsum.html |